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Note 
 
Up or Out: Why “Sufficiently Reliable” Statistical 
Risk Assessment Is Appropriate at Sentencing 
and Inappropriate at Parole 
Pari McGarraugh*
Imagine you are sitting before a parole board. Now imagine 
that your parole hearing is one of over 8000 the board will hear 
this year—more than thirty cases each working day
 
1—and that 
you have no lawyer to advocate for your cause.2 You know that 
state law requires the parole board to consider the results of a 
statistical risk assessment to determine your chances of recidi-
vism and thus the appropriateness of your release.3 Given the 
rushed nature of the proceeding, it occurs to you that the board 
is likely to weigh these results heavily.4 You ask for a copy of 
the risk assessment instrument or even a copy of your risk re-
port and the parole board refuses.5
 
*  J.D. and M.P.H. Candidate, University of Minnesota. Thanks to Pro-
fessor Kevin Reitz for his insight and guidance. Thanks also to Michel Bou-
dreaux for sharing his expertise in statistics. Endless thanks to my husband, 
Jordan Miller, for his unwavering support, shockingly convincing dinosaur 
impressions, and commitment to making fun a way of life—without him, I’d be 
a complete bore. Copyright © 2013 by Pari McGarraugh.  
 You start to wonder: What 
 1. SUSAN C. KINNEVY & JOEL M. CAPLAN, CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON YOUTH 
& SOC. POLICY, FINDINGS FROM THE APAI INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF RELEAS-
ING AUTHORITIES 9 (2008), available at http://paroleboard.arkansas.gov/ 
Resources/Documents/Publications/2008APAISurvey.pdf. 
 2. See Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that in-
mates do not have a constitutional right to have counsel or other advocates 
attend parole hearings). 
 3. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-404(4)(a)(II) (2012); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 54-124a(m) (2009). 
 4. Cf. Vincent O’Leary & Daniel Glaser, The Assessment of Risk in Parole 
Decision Making, in THE FUTURE OF PAROLE: COMMENTARIES ON SYSTEMS IN 
BRITAIN AND U.S.A. 135, 136 (D.J. West ed., 1972) (finding that 79.4% of pa-
role board members consider risk of recidivism if released to be a considera-
tion which “significantly influenced their decision”).  
 5. Some states treat documents examined by the parole board as confi-
dential and refuse access even to the inmate whose release is under considera-
tion. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-53 (2012).  
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factors is that risk assessment considering? Exactly what do 
the results mean? And most importantly, can a statistical mod-
el really predict the future with enough reliability that it ought 
to seal anyone’s fate? 
A statistical risk assessment instrument provides a struc-
tured way for the criminal justice system to evaluate the prob-
ability that an individual will reoffend.6 Such an instrument 
uses the statistical relationships between individual risk fac-
tors and criminal behavior to develop “explicit rules” that as-
sign weights to risk factors and combine the weights to produce 
“an objective estimate of violence risk.”7 A wide range of in-
struments are now in use, which accordingly have variable 
power to predict future dangerousness.8 States have been using 
risk assessment with increasing frequency and are unlikely to 
halt their efforts on this front.9
Presently, both sentencing judges and parole boards in 
states using indeterminate sentencing models, those jurisdic-
tions that allow the parole board discretionary release authori-
ty,
 Because the continued and ac-
celerated use of risk assessment instruments in criminal justice 
is inevitable, the relevant question is not if statistical risk as-
sessment ought to be used, but how it can be responsibly used.  
10 routinely use statistical risk assessment instruments when 
evaluating offenders.11
 
 6. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting 
Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 405 
(2006). 
 Inmates seeking parole release face the 
board and statistical risk assessment largely without legal pro-
 7. Id. at 405–06. 
 8. Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Of-
fender Recidivism: What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 590 (1996).  
 9. This increasing emphasis on empirically-measured risk is apparent 
from policy players with a wide range of political affiliations. See, e.g., AM. 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING IN-
CARCERATION RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES 9 (2011), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/smartreformispossible.pdf (argu-
ing that states should “[r]equire [e]vidence-[b]ased [c]riminal [j]ustice 
[p]ractices and [r]isk [a]ssessment [i]nstruments”); Priority Issues: Adult Pro-
bation, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/priority-issues/adult 
-probation/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2012) (“Probation can be made particularly 
efficient through the use of risk assessments . . . .”). 
 10. See Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 
EMORY L.J. 377, 382–83 (2005). 
 11. KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 12 (describing risk assessment at 
parole); Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: Are We Up to the Task?, 
23 FED. SENT’G REP. 153, 157 (2010) (reporting that in at least ten states, sen-
tencing judges use risk assessment instruments).  
  
2013] STATISTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1081 
 
tection12—they are not typically represented by counsel,13 the 
rules of evidence do not apply,14 and only the barest procedure 
is required to satisfy due process.15 By contrast, more robust 
protections are available to defendants post-conviction at sen-
tencing. These protections include, critically, the right to coun-
sel16 and the requirement that evidence introduced must meet a 
minimum standard of reliability.17
This Note argues in support of a recent draft of section 
6B.09 of the Model Penal Code (MPC) which suggests limiting 
the use of statistical risk assessment to the sentencing stage.
  
18 
Because there is meaningful protection for criminal defendants 
at sentencing that is not present at parole,19
 
 using statistical 
risk assessment at sentencing polices a basic line of fairness to 
criminal defendants. This Note expands upon the reasoning of 
the MPC by examining, in depth, the statistical and legal 
weaknesses of risk assessment instruments. Part I sets forth 
the basic protections available to defendants and inmates in 
indeterminate sentencing jurisdictions at parole and sentenc-
ing and describes the panoply of statistical risk assessment in-
struments and their use. Part II explores the practical and le-
gal limitations of these risk assessment instruments. Part III 
articulates the reasons why section 6B.09 is a reasonable com-
promise between fairness to defendants and protecting public 
safety and argues for an addition to the section establishing 
statutory criteria for determining if a risk assessment instru-
ment is “sufficiently reliable.”  
 
 12. Not all states stick to the bare constitutional minimum in parole pro-
ceedings. Some states provide for greater protection through statute. E.g., 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-670(3)(b) (2011) (allowing inmates to be represented in 
parole hearings).  
 13. N.M. CODE R. § 22.510.2.8(A)(3) (2001) (prohibiting legal counsel from 
attending parole hearings); Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1976).  
 14. See Davis v. Brown, 311 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting 
that the parole board may rely on hearsay evidence). 
 15. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 
U.S. 1, 16 (1979). 
 16. Gardener v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).  
 17. E.g., People v. Johnson, 499 N.E.2d 1355, 1371 (Ill. 1986). 
 18. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2011). 
 19. Compare, e.g., Gardener v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (right to 
counsel at sentencing), with Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1976) (no 
counsel at parole hearing). 
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I.  PROCEDURAL PROTECTION AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
INSTRUMENTS   
In indeterminate sentencing jurisdictions,20 the exact 
length of a defendant’s sentence is not known at the time of 
sentencing because the judge only designates a minimum and 
maximum sentence.21 Once the inmate has served the mini-
mum term, a parole board determines the actual length of a 
sentence because the board decides when parole release is ap-
propriate for each offender.22 Together, the parole board and 
the sentencing judge share responsibility for determining the 
length of an offender’s sentence.23 This sharing of decision-
making power is designed to ensure that “no man be impris-
oned unless it is clear that his freedom is dangerous to others, 
and that when once imprisoned, no man be freed until the dan-
ger has ceased.”24 Because a defendant has a more substantial 
liberty interest in the character of the sentencing procedure 
than an inmate has in the procedures for making parole release 
decisions, the Constitution demands distinctly different protec-
tions at each stage.25 Despite these differing levels of protec-
tion, both sentencing judges26 and parole release boards27
 
 20. By Professor Kevin Reitz’s count, over half of the states have sentenc-
ing and parole systems that incorporate indeterminate decision-making mech-
anisms. Kevin R. Reitz, The “Traditional” Indeterminate Sentencing Model, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 270, 289 n.1 
(Joan Petersilia ed., 2012) [hereinafter Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Mod-
el]. 
 are 
likely to use statistical risk assessment to guide their decisions.  
 21. LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE LAW AND POLICY OF SENTENCING AND COR-
RECTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 93 (8th ed. 2010).  
 22. DEAN J. CHAMPION, PROBATION, PAROLE AND COMMUNITY CORREC-
TIONS 241 (2d ed. 1996); Chanenson, supra note 10, at 382–83.  
 23. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 467 
(James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011) (noting the multiple decision-
makers involved in sentencing). 
 24. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENC-
ING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 94 (1976) (quoting Charlton T. Lewis).  
 25. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 283.  
 26. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, 
OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE-STAGE EVALUATION 11–12 
(2002).  
 27. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., INST. ON CRIME, JUSTICE, AND CORR. AT 
GEORGE WASH. UNIV., RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY STUDY OF THE LSI-R RISK 
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 5 (2003) (“Once an inmate becomes eligible for pa-
role, the decision to release that inmate is guided by an assessment of the in-
mate’s risk to public safety.”); KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 12 (finding 
88% of releasing authorities nationally use risk assessment instruments).  
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A. PROCEDURAL PROTECTION AT SENTENCING AND AT PAROLE 
Individuals are certainly interested in both sentencing de-
cisions and parole release decisions because both affect the 
amount of time an individual will spend incarcerated. But the 
Supreme Court has made clear that inmates have much less le-
gal interest in parole decisions than criminal defendants have 
in sentencing decisions.28 At sentencing, the defendant has a 
constitutional liberty interest and corresponding due process 
right in the character of the procedure employed.29 At parole, 
courts typically have found that inmates’ liberty interest in pa-
role release is constrained by the language of the state statute 
governing parole.30 Not all state parole systems create liberty 
interests in parole release.31 To give rise to a liberty interest, 
the statute must do more than establish a system for granting 
parole release.32 It must create an entitlement to such release, 
which would lead to a grievous loss if parole release were de-
nied.33 A statute might create an entitlement and the corre-
sponding grievous loss by, for example, providing that an in-
mate “shall” be released if certain criteria are met,34 or by 
substantially limiting the parole board’s discretion in making 
release decisions.35 Based on the line of cases establishing this 
rule, state legislatures have deliberately phrased parole stat-
utes so that they do not create liberty interests.36
 
 28. Compare Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (finding that 
the Constitution requires the state to provide counsel to an indigent defendant 
facing potential incarceration), with Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal 
& Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (“There is a crucial distinction between 
being deprived of a liberty one has . . . and being denied a conditional liberty 
that one desires.”). 
 Accordingly, 
 29. E.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471 (1981) (analyzing a defend-
ant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Williams v. Currie, 103 F. Supp. 2d 
858, 868 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (finding that imposing longer sentences on men than 
on women, without a justifying government interest, violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause). 
 30. E.g., Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 372 (1987).  
 31. E.g., id. (noting that Montana does not provide a liberty interest in 
parole). 
 32. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480–81, 483–84 (1995). 
 33. Id.  
 34. E.g., Allen, 482 U.S. at 377–78. 
 35. E.g., Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462 (1989), partial-
ly overruled on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 n.5. 
 36. See, e.g., Worden v. Mont. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 962 P.2d 1157, 
1165 (Mont. 1998) (“In response to Allen, the Montana legislature amended 
[the parole statute] to state that ‘the Board may release’ inmates on pa-
role . . . ” (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201 (1989))). 
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states typically afford inmates considerably less procedural 
protection at parole than at sentencing.37
The courts have not examined the outside limits on the 
types of procedures a parole board may or may not use for two 
reasons. First, inmates do not challenge the denial of parole as 
often as defendants challenge sentences because “meaningful 
review . . . is lacking in virtually all American parole sys-
tems.”
  
38 Second, because state law frequently prohibits inmates 
from examining their own dossiers39 and parole boards are not 
typically required to articulate their reasons for denying pa-
role,40 an inmate may not have enough information about the 
parole board’s decision to object to it.41 In a similar vein, the pa-
role process itself is often opaque—to inmates, to judges, and to 
the general public.42 Even though states typically lay out parole 
processes in statute,43 it may be difficult to verify if parole 
boards are following statutory procedures because state law 
may not require the parole board to produce a record of its pro-
ceedings.44 The lack of both judicial guidance and transparency 
means that an inmate’s rights at parole are not as well-defined 
as a defendant’s rights are at sentencing.45
 
 37. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 
 Despite the uncer-
tainty regarding the precise limits of required procedural pro-
tection, several things are clear: the right to counsel, eviden-
tiary standards, and the qualifications of the decision-maker 
are distinctly different at sentencing and parole. 
20, at 283 (noting 
that if the procedural protections at sentencing are “second-string,” the “pro-
cedural accoutrements of parole release are of the third- or fourth-string varie-
ty”).  
 38. Id. at 285.  
 39. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.510 (LexisNexis 2010).  
 40. See Glover v. Mich. Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603–04 (Mich. 1999).  
 41. The American Law Institute argues for placing risk assessment at 
sentencing because “substantive concerns . . . will no doubt be brought forward 
in the courtroom setting—issues that were never raised in the low-visibility, 
low-process forums of parole release.” MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING  
§ 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011). 
 42. See, e.g., Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Pro-
moting Public Safety Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1389, 1404 (2008) (noting that sentencing judges are consistently ignorant of 
parole procedures and practices).  
 43. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 24-15-1 to 30 (2012).  
 44. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 285. 
 45. See id. 
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1. The Right to Counsel 
The distinction between the right to counsel at the sentenc-
ing stage and at the parole stage is straightforward. At sen-
tencing, the defendant facing potential imprisonment has a 
Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of an attorney.46 
Moreover, an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed coun-
sel at sentencing.47 By contrast, there is no constitutional right 
to counsel at parole hearings.48 This difference appears to be 
premised on the fundamentally different liberty interests in-
volved at each stage.49
At sentencing, courts emphasize that even though the con-
victed defendant does not have a legal interest in what sen-
tence the court imposes, the defendant does have an interest in 
the quality of the decision-making process.
  
50 Representation at 
this “critical stage of the proceedings”51 ensures that defendants 
take the appropriate steps to preserve their right to appeal sen-
tencing decisions.52 Further, a vigorous defense at sentencing 
evens the playing field in a way that is “essential to the truth-
seeking function . . . which may influence the sentencing deci-
sion.”53 A defense lawyer is responsible for ensuring that the 
“sentence [is] not predicated on misinformation.”54 In this way, 
the right to counsel goes hand in hand with the application of 
evidentiary standards, discussed below.55
 
  
 
 46. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).  
 47. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979).  
 48. See Franciosi v. Mich. Parole Bd., 604 N.W.2d 675, 676 (Mich. 2000) 
(finding that, without a discussion constitutional rights, the state statute did 
not permit lawyers to “act as a legal representative of a prisoner during a pa-
role interview”). 
 49. Compare Rhay, 389 U.S. at 137 (framing the right to counsel in consti-
tutional terms), with Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466 
(1981) (framing the liberty interest at parole in relation to the procedural pro-
tections offered by the state statute).  
 50. E.g., Perdue v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 909, 913 (Ky. 2002). 
 51. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 
903 n.13 (Mass. 2004). 
 52. Rhay, 389 U.S. at 135 (finding that legal representation is important 
because “certain legal rights may be lost if not exercised at this stage”). 
 53. Gardener v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977).  
 54. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).  
 55. See id. (connecting the right to counsel at sentencing with protection 
against receiving a sentence based on inaccurate evidence).  
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2. Evidentiary Standards 
Although the rules of evidence applicable at the guilt stage 
of a trial do not attach in either sentencing or parole hearings,56 
defendants and inmates are entitled to some protection because 
neither sentencing judges nor parole board members may con-
sider certain kinds of evidence.57 Insofar as there are eviden-
tiary limits, they fall into two broad categories. First, at least 
at sentencing, evidence must meet a minimal standard of relia-
bility.58 Second, sentencing judges and parole boards may make 
only limited use of certain characteristics of the defendant or 
inmate such as race, nationality, and gender.59
a. Reliability of Evidence 
  
In general, sentencing judges have wide discretion to con-
sider whatever evidence they find useful.60 However, this dis-
cretion is not unlimited.61 Evidence considered at sentencing 
must be accurate enough to guarantee the defendant’s due pro-
cess rights.62 A sentencing judge may not base her decision on 
information that is “extensively and materially false”63 and she 
may only consider evidence that is “relevant and reliable.”64
 
 56. E.g., Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. 2010) (sentencing); 
see, e.g., Davis v. Brown, 311 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115 (D.D.C. 2004) (parole).  
 De-
fense attorneys can, and do, challenge expert evidence offered 
 57. People v. Morgan, 492 N.E.2d 1303, 1317 (Ill. 1986).  
 58. People v. Owens, 464 N.E.2d 261, 271 (Ill. 1984).  
 59. E.g., United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (the 
court may not consider the defendant’s race when imposing a sentence); Tex. 
Supporters of Workers World Party Pres. Candidates v. Strake, 511 F. Supp. 
149, 155 (D.C. Tex. 1981) (recognizing the right to be considered for parole 
“without invidious discrimination based on race or national origin”). But see 
Wildermuth v. Furlong, 147 F.3d 1234, 1239 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting cir-
cuit disagreement on whether a substantive due process right can be violated 
in the absence of a liberty interest at parole which gives rise to a procedural 
due process right). 
 60. State v. Conn, 669 P.2d 581, 583 (Ariz. 1983).  
 61. Id. 
 62. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980) (“We have . . . sus-
tained due process objections to sentences imposed on the basis of misinfor-
mation of constitutional magnitude.” (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 
U.S. 443, 447 (1972))). Note that evidentiary standards tend to use “reliable” 
to mean “accurate” or “valid,” despite the fact that the two terms have distinct 
meanings in the scientific and statistical literature. See Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–95 (1993).  
 63. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).  
 64. People v. Morgan, 492 N.E.2d 1303, 1317 (Ill. 1986).  
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by the prosecution at sentencing as unreliable.65 Even when the 
sentencing judge finds the evidence reliable and admits it, the 
effort in raising the objection is not wasted. The objection sensi-
tizes the court to the limitations of the evidence and may in-
spire the court to afford the evidence less weight.66 The situa-
tion at parole is markedly different. Although the contours of 
an inmate’s due process right to have a release decision based 
on reliable information are not defined,67 it is clear that parole 
boards routinely consider exceptionally unreliable evidence like 
“unsubstantiated rumors.”68
Only one
 
69 appellate court has considered whether statisti-
cal risk assessment to predict future dangerousness is reliable 
enough to be admitted in a sentencing hearing.70 The Indiana 
Supreme Court reviewed the literature on statistical risk as-
sessment and concluded that the instrument in question, the 
Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R), was “statistically 
valid, reliable, and effective in forecasting recidivism.”71 
Though the evidence was admitted, the defendant’s objection 
was productive because the court explicitly opined that a sen-
tencing judge may not base the sentence solely on the results of 
the instrument.72
b. Prohibited Categories of Evidence 
  
There is extensive case law suggesting that neither sen-
tencing judges, nor parole boards may base decisions on a de-
 
 65. E.g., Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ind. 2010); see Barefoot 
v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds, 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,  
§ 102, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
 66. See State v. Woomer, 299 S.E.2d 317, 320 (S.C. 1982) (“[T]he appel-
lant’s objection was addressed to the weight of the evidence and not to its ad-
missibility.”).  
 67. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft 
No. 2, 2011) (noting that parole release is “low-visibility, low-process” and un-
likely to encourage meaningful review).  
 68. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 284 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 16 
(“[I]t seems that [Parole Boards] are willing to listen to anyone with 
knowledge of or interest in the offender’s case.”). 
 69. Warren, supra note 11, at 156 (noting that only the Indiana Supreme 
Court has considered the issue). 
 70. In two opinions issued the same day, the Indiana Supreme Court al-
lowed the admission of risk assessment results in sentencing hearings. 
Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 573; J.S. v. State, 928 N.E.2d 576, 577 (Ind. 2010). 
 71. Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 573. 
 72. Id. at 568.  
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fendant’s or inmate’s race,73 gender,74 or national origin without 
adequate justification.75 In the sentencing context, the Consti-
tution does not categorically prohibit consideration of race, 
gender or nationality; it simply prohibits certain kinds of con-
sideration.76 In particular, consideration of gender at sentenc-
ing “must pass heightened scrutiny by substantially furthering 
a legitimate government interest.”77 For example, in United 
States v. Maples, the reviewing court found that the sentencing 
judge unconstitutionally imposed a longer sentence on a male 
defendant than on a female co-defendant.78 Specifically, the 
court found that because there was no link between female 
gender and the policy goals of rehabilitation or deterrence, it 
could not use gender as a factor in sentencing.79
Classifications based on race or ethnicity in sentencing 
must typically pass an even more rigorous test.
  
80
 
 73. United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (sentencing); 
Tex. Supporters of Workers World Party Presidential Candidates v. Strake, 
511 F. Supp. 149, 155 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (parole). 
 In that in-
stance, the court requires more than a simple connection be-
tween the protected category and a general propensity to deter-
rence or rehabilitation to legitimate the racial or ethnic 
classification. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Borrero-
Isaza, found that the trial judge unconstitutionally considered 
the defendant’s Colombian nationality when setting his sen-
 74. Williams v. Currie, 103 F. Supp. 2d 858, 868 (M.D. N.C. 2000) (sen-
tencing); see Walker v. Luther, 644 F. Supp. 76, 81 (D. Conn. 1986) (finding 
parole standards that established different standards for men and women vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause because the state failed to articulate a ra-
tional basis for the disparate treatment).  
 75. United States v. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1349, 1355–56 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(sentencing); Parisie v. Morris, 873 F. Supp. 1560, 1563 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (pa-
role). 
 76. E.g., United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1986) (find-
ing that a sentencing judge may consider a defendant’s nationality when de-
termining “the identity of the countries which are recognized as often the 
source” of the drugs involved in the underlying crime).  
 77. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 862 (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 
511 U.S. 127, 137 (1993)). 
 78. 501 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1974).  
 79. Id. 
 80. Challenges to the use of race at sentencing are raised under both the 
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. See United States v. 
Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 804 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). While the tests for these two 
constitutional protections are different, the result is largely the same as race 
is not generally a permissible consideration at sentencing under either test. 
See id. 
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tence following a conviction for a drug crime.81 The court sug-
gested there would have to be specific evidence demonstrating 
a direct connection between the defendant’s nationality and his 
crime, for example, if the defendant had trafficked drugs from 
Colombia, for his Colombian nationality to be relevant to his 
sentence.82 As discussed below, this prohibition on considering 
race, gender, and nationality characteristics that are uncon-
nected to the commission of the convicted crime has significant 
ramifications in terms of the positive predictive power of statis-
tical risk assessment instruments because gender and race are 
strong predictors of recidivism.83
3. Qualifications of the Decision-Maker 
 
The most obvious difference between sentence-length deci-
sions made at parole and those made at sentencing is the iden-
tity of the decision-maker.84 At sentencing, a judge is typically 
calling the shots.85 Although they may be appointed or elected,86 
all trial judges are experienced in assessing the weight of evi-
dence,87 facilitating the adversarial truth-finding process,88 and 
remaining objective.89 By contrast, parole board members, typi-
cally appointed by the governor,90 make the decision to release 
or not release a particular inmate.91
 
 81. 887 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 Because “political connec-
 82. Id. at 1356. 
 83. Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 583.  
 84. See Reitz, Sentencing, supra note 23, at 467. 
 85. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948). 
 86. See Note, Merit Appointment Versus Popular Election: A Reformer’s 
Guide to Judicial Selection Methods in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 529, 530 (1991) 
(describing methods of selecting judges in the United States).  
 87. Cf. David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of 
Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1088 
(1989) (noting that the judge’s admissibility decision is followed by the trier-of-
fact’s determination of what weight the evidence deserves).  
 88. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977) (noting the Court’s 
“belief that debate between adversaries is often essential to the truth-seeking 
function of trials”). 
 89. Not surprisingly, there is a mass of literature questioning the objectiv-
ity of judges. See, e.g., Shira J. Goodman et al., What’s More Important: Elect-
ing Judges or Judicial Independence? It’s Time for Pennsylvania to Choose Ju-
dicial Independence, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 859, 860 (2010). This preoccupation with 
the failures of judicial objectivity illuminates the centrality of the goal of im-
partiality.  
 90. KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 7 (finding that governors appoint 
85% of releasing authorities with fixed terms of office).  
 91. Id. at 10. 
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tions are often the main prerequisite for appointment” to a pa-
role board,92 and because the process of parole is largely invisi-
ble to the public,93 there is a risk that the parole board might be 
susceptible to political pressure. As one Arkansas parole board 
member put it: “If the governor likes you, you might get to keep 
your job.”94 Although it is popular to say that parole board 
members are “experts” in determining when release is appro-
priate,95 this may not be the case as many states have excep-
tionally minimal requirements for board membership.96
Together, the availability of counsel, the requirement of 
minimally reliable evidence, and qualified judicial oversight 
provide a relatively robust system of procedural protection for 
defendants at sentencing. By contrast, the protection for in-
mates seeking parole release is flimsy. These differences in 
procedural protection offer a defendant seeking a fair sentenc-
ing process more points of intervention than an inmate hoping 
for parole release is likely to have.  
  
B. STATISTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
The details of state criminal sentencing systems vary wide-
ly, but both sentencing judges and parole boards may use sta-
tistical risk assessment to inform their decisions.97
 
 92. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 
 Before con-
sidering the appropriate procedural placement for such risk 
assessment instruments, it is worthwhile to examine the in-
struments themselves, the theory underlying their develop-
20, at 285.  
 93. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 
2, 2011). 
 94. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 285 (quoting 
Arkansas Times Staff & Max Brantley, Web Special: Dumond Case Revisited, 
ARK. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/web-special-
dumond-case-revisited/Content?oid=862759). 
 95. See THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SEN-
TENCING, supra note 24, at 117 (noting that a parole board is to “administer 
[its] decision in accordance with its expertise”).  
 96. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-5(2) (2009) (requiring only that parole 
board members have “at least a bachelor’s degree or a high school diploma and 
four (4) years’ work experience”).  
 97. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, 
supra note 26, at 11–12 (sentencing); KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 12 
(parole); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125a(a) (“A person . . . may be allowed 
to go at large on parole in the discretion of the panel of the Board of Parole . . . 
if (1) it appears . . . that there is a reasonable probability that such inmate will 
live and remain at liberty without violating the law . . . .”); AUSTIN, supra note 
27, at 5 (“Once an inmate becomes eligible for parole, the decision to release 
that inmate is guided by an assessment of the inmate’s risk to public safety.”). 
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ment, and their purposes in the punishment process. The focus 
of this Note is on the use of statistical risk assessment to aid in 
sentencing and parole release decisions. These are not the only 
possible uses of statistical instruments. State departments of 
corrections and parole also use these instruments to assess the 
rehabilitative needs of inmates, probationers, and those on pa-
role release.98 Although statistical models are sometimes used 
to assess both needs and risk99 and the two are occasionally 
treated interchangeably,100 needs assessment is distinct from 
risk assessment.101 Needs assessment has a broader focus and 
attempts to match an offender with optimal corrections pro-
gramming.102 By contrast, risk assessment focuses on measur-
ing an individual’s chances of endangering public safety by 
reoffending.103
States use a wide variety of instruments for risk assess-
ment. Some use commercially-developed instruments, like the 
LSI-R
  
104 or its progeny.105 Others use instruments developed in-
house by state agencies.106 A survey conducted by the Center for 
Research on Youth and Social Policy reported that eighteen 
states developed their own instrument in-house, twelve states 
use the LSI-R instrument, and nine states use one or more of 
an array of other instruments.107
 
 98. See, e.g., STATE OF CONN., DEP’T OF CORR., CRIMINAL JUSTICE RISK 
ASSESSMENT STRATEGY 5 (2009), available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/lib/doc/ 
PDF/PDFReport/RiskAssessmentStrategy.pdf (“The following assessment in-
struments are utilized for the purposes of risk, program needs and interven-
tions, classification, development of the Offender Accountability Plan, facility 
assignment and discharge planning.”). 
 In general, these instruments 
 99. See id. 
 100. See D.A. Andrews et al., The Recent Past and Near Future of Risk 
and/or Need Assessment, 52 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 7 passim (2006).  
 101. This fact is frequently noted. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING  
§ 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (“Needs and risk assessments are 
distinct tasks . . . .”); see also NANCY M. CAMPBELL, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., 
COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR PAROLING AUTHORITIES IN AN ERA OF EVI-
DENCE-BASED PRACTICES 37 (2008) (describing the difference between the 
“needs principle” and the “risk principle”). 
 102. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, 
supra note 26, at 44. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES L. BONTA, MULTI-HEALTH SYS., INC., 
LSI-R: LEVEL OF SERVICE INVENTORY-REVISED (2008), available at 
http://www.assessments.com/assessments_documentation/LSI-R%20Technical% 
20Brochure.pdf. 
 105. KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 13.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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require input of a number of data points about the defendant or 
inmate including factors related to criminal history, family life, 
education, and employment history.108 These data points may 
be either static factors, meaning that they will not change dur-
ing the individual’s incarceration, or dynamic factors, meaning 
that the input value may change if the individual’s behavior or 
attitudes change.109 For example, the STATIC-99 risk assess-
ment instrument, used by seventeen states to evaluate sex of-
fenders’ risk of recidivism,110 uses static factors like whether 
the individual has prior convictions.111 Dynamic factors take ac-
count of the inmate’s post-incarceration behavior. Factors 
might include, for example, whether an inmate has completed 
correctional programming while incarcerated.112 Although the 
vast majority of instruments do not explicitly consider race,113 
many consider other factors that have considerable overlap 
with race, most notably neighborhood of residence.114 Some 
states employ instruments that use gender as a predictor,115 or 
have developed separate instruments for men and women.116
 
 108. See, e.g., ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 
 
104.  
 109. Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 575–76.  
 110. KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 13. 
 111. STATIC-99 Tally Sheet, STATIC-99 CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www 
.static99.org/pdfdocs/static-99-coding-rules_e71.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012). 
 112. Maryland’s instrument includes this measure. SHAMIR RATANSI & 
STEPHEN M. COX, STATE OF CONN., ASSESSMENT AND VALIDATION OF 
CONNECTICUT’S SALIENT FACTOR SCORE unpublished Appendix C (2007) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Appendix C]. 
 113. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 280. One 
judge in Oregon has developed a “sentencing support” software program that 
considers race/ethnicity in developing a risk profile for a defendant. MICHAEL 
MARCUS, SENTENCING SUPPORT TOOLS: USER MANUAL FOR JUDGES 10 (2009). 
This strategy appears to be unique. 
 114. See ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 104 (including neighborhood of 
residence in the “accommodation” factor of the LSI-R); Alexander M. Holsinger 
et al., Ethnicity, Gender, and the Level of Service Inventory-Revised, 31 J. 
CRIM. JUST. 309, 315, 318 (2003) (noting racial trends in seven of ten areas 
measured by the LSI-R).  
 115. E.g., THE NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIM. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 26, at 27. Interestingly, members of parole boards report 
that they only very rarely consider the offender’s gender in making their pa-
role release decisions. KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 19. This may indi-
cate that the parole board is unaware of whether the risk assessment rolls 
gender into the score an inmate receives. 
 116. THOMAS BLOMBERG ET AL., VALIDATION OF THE COMPAS RISK AS-
SESSMENT CLASSIFICATION INSTRUMENT 13 (2010), available at http://www 
.criminologycenter.fsu.edu/p/pdf/pretrial/Broward%20Co.%20COMPAS% 
20Validation%202010.pdf. 
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Risk assessment scores may be obtained based on interviews,117 
pen and paper checklists,118 or by automatically extracting data 
from the inmate or defendant’s record.119 The personnel respon-
sible for administering risk assessments varies state by state;120 
but, in any case, significant staff training is necessary to ad-
minister the instruments competently and with consistent pro-
ficiency.121
Methods of writing statistical risk assessment instruments 
fall into two categories.
 
122 First, an instrument may be based on 
empirical data.123 This type of instrument is developed by draw-
ing a sample of offenders, observing recidivism rates as well as 
other offender characteristics and then using the statistical re-
lationships between these characteristics and recidivism to 
build the instrument.124 Once built, the risk assessment in-
strument produces individual numeric risk scores depending on 
the characteristics of the individual being assessed.125 For ex-
ample, Virginia used a common statistical method, multivari-
ate logistic regression, to construct a risk assessment instru-
ment that estimates risk of recidivism based on eleven factors 
including gender, age, employment status, and factors related 
to prior criminal behavior.126
 
 117. Holsinger et al., supra note 
 Risk assessment instruments may 
114, at 310 (describing administration of 
the LSI-R). 
 118. Tammy Meredith et al., Developing and Implementing Automated 
Risk Assessments in Parole, 9 JUST. RESEARCH & POL’Y 1, 2 (2007). 
 119. Id.  
 120. For example, in Connecticut, prison personnel are responsible for ad-
ministering risk assessment instruments, see STATE OF CONN., DEP’T OF 
CORR., supra note 98, at 5, while in Los Angeles County, probation officers are 
responsible for ongoing risk and needs assessment with their probationers, see 
SUSAN TURNER & TERRY FAIN, VALIDATION OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
PROBATION DEPARTMENT’S RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS, at xi 
(2003), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/201303.pdf. 
 121. Anthony W. Flores et al., Predicting Outcome with the Level of Service 
Inventory-Revised: The Importance of Implementation Integrity, 34 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 523, 528 (2006); see also AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 15. 
 122. DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, WHAT WORKS IN CORRECTIONS: REDUC-
ING THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF OFFENDERS AND DELINQUENTS 63 (2006). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  
 125. See Kirk Heilbrun et al., Violence Risk Assessment Tools: Overview 
and Critical Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT 1, 5 
(Randy K. Otto & Kevin S. Douglas eds., 2010) (noting that empirically de-
rived risk assessment instruments produce reproducible scores based on the 
“predictor variables”).  
 126. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIM. SENTENCING COMM’N, su-
pra note 26, at 26–27. 
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also be developed theoretically.127 Theoretical risk assessment 
instruments measure variables that are, according to psycholo-
gy or criminology experts, “theoretically related” to recidi-
vism128 and then measure the statistical relationship between 
these variables and recidivism in populations.129 Theoretical 
risk assessment instruments, including the popular LSI-R,130 
typically use the correlation between values of variables and 
recidivism risk to assign weights to inmates’ responses.131 The-
se weights are added to produce numeric risk scores.132 Risk as-
sessment instruments developed through either method typi-
cally produce risk scores on a finite scale, for example, from 
zero to twelve.133 Risk instruments themselves do not necessari-
ly resolve downstream policy choices of determining meaningful 
cutoffs in risk scores.134
In general it is difficult for a lay person to access infor-
mation about a state’s policy with respect to risk assessment 
instruments.
 
135
 
 127. MACKENZIE, supra note 
 Often states do not readily provide information 
about which risk assessment they use, how the instruments 
were developed, or how they are used in practice. For example, 
a request for the “risk assessment instrument . . . along with 
122, at 63. 
 128. Id.; see also PETER RAYNOR ET AL., RISK AND NEED ASSESSMENT IN 
PROBATION SERVICES: AN EVALUATION 9 (2000), available at http://library 
.npia.police.uk/docs/hors/hors211.pdf (describing the selection of items in the 
LSI-R as “intended to have a theoretical and professional rationale justifying 
the selection of these particular items as relevant to offending”). 
 129. MACKENZIE, supra note 124, at 63. 
 130. See, e.g., Holsinger et al., supra note 114, at 310. 
 131. See, e.g., Risk to Re-offend Score Chart, GA. STATE BOARD PARDONS & 
PAROLES, http://www.pap.state.ga.us/opencms/export/sites/default/resources/ 
RISK_TO_RE.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012) (laying out Georgia’s summation 
scoring method). 
 132. Id. 
 133. STATIC-99 Tally Sheet, supra note 111.  
 134. Although the responsibility for determining the acceptable level of risk 
rests with the states, the developers of risk assessment instruments may pro-
vide guidance on how state officials, including parole boards and judges ought 
to interpret the results. See, e.g., D.A. Andrews, James Bonta & Stephen 
Wormith, The Level of Service (LS) Assessment of Adults and Older Adoles-
cents, in HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 125, at 199, 
205. 
 135. See Susan J. Sachsenmaier & Stephen J. Lally, Toward a Scientific 
Foundation of Sex Offender Risk Assessment, in SEX AND VIOLENCE: THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF CRIME AND RISK ASSESSMENT 26–27 (David P. Farrington et al. 
eds., 2001). 
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any accompanying documentation or manuals for its use”136 
made under New York’s Freedom of Information Law yields on-
ly a copy of a memorandum from the Chairwoman of New 
York’s Board of Parole explaining appropriate use of the state’s 
newest instrument,137 and a printout of the risk assessment 
scoring sheet.138
II.  STATISTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT’S LEGAL AND 
EMPIRICAL LIMITATIONS   
 No information about the design or validation 
of the instrument is provided. Given the range of possible 
methods by which a statistical risk assessment instrument may 
be prepared and the nuanced ways in which this method affects 
the validity and reliability of the instrument, as discussed be-
low, the unavailability of this type of information is troubling.  
True risk assessment instruments are creatures of statis-
tics and thus are subject to a number of inherent limitations. 
No matter how thorough the analysis, no statistical model can 
ever be completely accurate.139 Uncertainty in the result pro-
duced is inevitable. For example, a hypothetical risk assess-
ment instrument might predict that a particular offender has a 
25% probability of reoffending. That 25% is a point estimate. 
Such a point estimate does not express how confident a statisti-
cian is in that the estimate is accurate. To understand the de-
gree of confidence, statisticians look to a confidence interval in-
dicating the range of possible values around the point estimate 
that the true value is likely to be.140
Because perfection is not possible, states ought to face 
head-on the issue of uncertainty and develop strategies for 
 Perhaps the instrument is 
very robust and produces a very narrow confidence interval—
say, that evaluator is 95% sure that the true value of the of-
fender’s risk of reoffending is between 24% and 26%. Alterna-
tively, the instrument might be very weak and produce a 95% 
confidence interval of between 10% and 40%.  
 
 136. Letter from Pari McGarraugh, to Patrick Lawlor, N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & 
Comm. Supervision, Counsel’s Office (Nov. 2, 2011) (on file with author).  
 137. Memorandum from Andrea W. Evans, Chairwoman, N.Y. Dep’t of 
Corr. & Comm. Supervision, to the Members of the Board of Parole (Oct. 5, 
2011) (on file with author). 
 138. COMPAS REENTRY ASSESSMENT (2007) (on file with author).  
 139. Emma J. Palmer, Risk Assessment: Review of Psychometric Measures, 
in SEX AND VIOLENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME AND RISK ASSESSMENT, 
supra note 135, at 7.  
 140. RAND R. WILCOX, BASIC STATISTICS: UNDERSTANDING CONVENTIONAL 
METHODS AND MODERN INSIGHTS 103 (2009). 
  
1096 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1079 
 
managing it.141 Despite how important it is to resolve questions 
of predictive power, not all states directly address the problem. 
In fact, only about 85% of states using risk assessment instru-
ments report having validated the instruments in the state’s 
own population in any way.142
A. THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING RISK ASSESSMENT 
INSTRUMENTS ARE OFTEN UNJUSTIFIED 
 The following sections outline 
these concerns by examining weaknesses of statistical risk as-
sessment instruments both theoretically and in practice.  
As discussed above, risk assessments are typically based 
on the results of regression models or are constructed as 
weighted sums.143 Instruments based on regression models 
make several assumptions related to their external validity. 
First, regression models assume random selection, meaning 
that each individual in the population of interest has an equal 
chance of being included in the sample.144 Second, regression 
models assume independence of observations, meaning that the 
behavior of each individual in the population is entirely unre-
lated to the behavior of any of the others.145 In the context of 
risk assessment, neither of these assumptions is likely to be 
justified.146 High quality data on recidivism is scarce and cer-
tain types of outcomes, like whether an incarcerated person 
would have reoffended if released, are counterfactual and in-
herently impossible to measure directly.147 For this reason, data 
sets underlying risk assessment instruments tend to be “con-
venience samples” rather than true random samples drawn 
from the population of interest.148
 
 141. Cf. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIM. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
supra note 
 Furthermore, individuals in 
these samples are rarely independent because they are likely to 
26, at 29–30 (describing Virginia’s method of determining an ap-
propriate risk threshold for diverting an offender from incarceration).  
 142. KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 13. 
 143. MACKENZIE, supra note 122, at 63.  
 144. Richard A. Berk & David A. Freedman, Statistical Assumptions as 
Empirical Commitments, in PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF SHELDON L. MESSINGER 245 n.1 (Thomas G. Blomberg & Stanley 
Cohen eds., 1995). 
 145. Id. at 245 n.1, n.4. 
 146. Id. at 246.  
 147. Cf. Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., Risk/Need Assessment, Offender 
Classification, and the Role of Childhood Abuse, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAVIOR 
543, 548–49 (2001) (including only those inmates released on parole in the val-
idation study).  
 148. See Berk & Freedman, supra note 144, at 246. 
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have shared influences like supervision by the same parole of-
ficer.149 Indeed, such samples are likely to be inherently clus-
tered around particular programs or geographic locations.150 
That such clustered observations are likely not to be independ-
ent because individuals systematically share characteristics 
does not necessarily bias the result of an analysis, but it does 
result in an overestimate of certainty.151
Even if the sample is properly drawn and the analysis per-
fectly conducted, statistical models only predict probable behav-
ior for a typical member of the population from which the origi-
nal sample was drawn.
 
152 This poses obvious problems when the 
sample population is very different than the one in which the 
risk assessment instrument is to be used.153 For example, the 
LSI-R was developed in populations of Canadian inmates, and, 
although the instrument was validated in inmate populations 
in the United States, the validation may provide false comfort 
as its sample included predominantly Caucasian inmates.154 
This methodological quirk is not benign; other research shows 
that the LSI-R predicts recidivism much less effectively for Af-
rican-Americans and Hispanics than for Caucasians.155 Assum-
ing a close match between the sample population and the popu-
lation in which the instrument is to be applied, a good risk 
assessment instrument still only predicts average behaviors.156
 
 149. See id. at 250. 
 
The instrument cannot predict the behavior of any one individ-
 150. See id. at 246 (noting “the data in hand are simply the data most read-
ily available”).  
 151. See Jeromy Anglim, Clustered Samples and Assuming Independence of 
Observations, JEROMY ANGLIM’S BLOG: PSYCHOLOGY AND STATISTICS (Feb. 26, 
2010), http://jeromyanglim.blogspot.com/2010/02/clustered-samples-and 
-assuming.html. 
 152. See Berk & Freedman, supra note 144, at 245. 
 153. See Lowenkamp et al., supra note 147, at 560 (conceding that the re-
sults of the validation study are limited if the sample was not representative). 
 154. Melinda D. Schlager & David J. Simourd, Validity of the Level of Ser-
vice Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) Among African American and Hispanic Male 
Offenders, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAVIOR 545, 546 (2007).  
 155. Id. at 553.  
 156. Kathleen Auerhahn, Selective Incapacitation and the Problem of Pre-
diction, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 703, 708 (1999). 
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ual.157 By definition, these risk assessment instruments fail to 
account for atypical behavior.158
In addition, risk assessment instruments based on either 
summation models, such as the LSI-R, or regressions are sub-
ject to an additional key limitation. Unless specifically designed 
to do so, the instrument cannot account for interaction between 
input measures. They assume that the uptick in risk of recidi-
vism associated with each input factor remains constant re-
gardless of inputs on other risk factors.
  
159 To illustrate, Geor-
gia’s risk assessment instrument, used to guide parole release 
decisions, uses a summation model and assigns two risk 
“points” to an offender who has a history of drug or alcohol 
abuse no matter the inmate’s age when he entered prison.160 
Georgia’s model assumes that at every age, a history of drug or 
alcohol abuse has the same effect on risk of recidivism.161 The 
failure to account for interaction between substance abuse and 
age is significant because there is evidence indicating that the 
risk of recidivism associated with prior substance abuse does 
indeed vary with age.162 This shortcoming is relevant for risk 
factors other than history of substance abuse because interac-
tions between multiple risk factors are likely to have a signifi-
cant impact on the predictive power of the instrument,163 espe-
cially in offender subpopulations.164
Risk assessment instruments frequently assume random 
selection, independence of individuals and a lack of interaction 
between variables.
 
165
 
 157. Id.; see also O’Leary & Glaser, supra note 
 Because, as discussed above, these as-
sumptions are unlikely to be justified in practice, published 
4, at 140 (noting that alt-
hough older inmates are less likely to reoffend than younger inmates, “[b]y no 
means should it be inferred that all old prisoners are good risks or all young-
sters poor risks”). 
 158. O’Leary & Glaser, supra note 4, at 140. 
 159. See RAYNOR ET AL., supra note 128, at 65. 
 160. See Risk to Re-offend Score Chart, supra note 131. 
 161. See id. 
 162. Cf. Darrell J. Steffensmeier et al., Age and the Distribution of Crime, 
94 AM. J. SOC. 803, 821 (finding that the risk of committing a substance-
related crime is dramatically skewed toward younger offenders).  
 163. E.g., MICHAEL SHADER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RISK FACTORS FOR 
DELINQUENCY: AN OVERVIEW 7 (2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/ojjdp/frd030127.pdf; cf. David A. Wolfe & Robin McGee, Dimensions 
of Child Maltreatment and Their Relationship to Adolescent Adjustment, 6 
DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 165, 178 (1994) (noting that interactions between 
risk factors are “powerful predictors” of child maltreatment).  
 164. See RAYNOR ET AL., supra note 128, at 65. 
 165. See id.; Berk & Freedman, supra note 144, at 245 n.1. 
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studies evaluating risk assessment instruments tend to over-
state their predictive power.166
B. GARBAGE IN, GARBAGE OUT 
  
It is well-recognized that the output of a statistical model 
is only as good as the input data.167 In the risk assessment con-
text, the “garbage in, garbage out” problem comes up when the 
instrument requires subjective input factors that are difficult to 
measure accurately,168 even in a controlled research setting.169 
Many risk assessment models incorporate subjective varia-
bles170 which are notoriously difficult to measure consistently.171 
The garbage in, garbage out problem is especially likely to ap-
ply to dynamic factors not apparent until the individual has 
been observed in the prison environment because such dynamic 
factors tend to focus on subjective evaluations rather than on 
easily categorized characteristics.172 Given the unavoidable dif-
ficulty in consistently and accurately measuring such factors, 
there is likely to be non-negligible error in these data points.173
 
 166. See Patrick Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age 
of Globalization, 91 IOWA L. REV. 505, 524 (2006) (noting “most models incor-
porate too many simplifications and occasionally unrealistic assumptions to be 
accurate”). 
 
For example, Alabama’s risk assessment instrument, used to 
guide parole decision-making, asks the rater to evaluate where 
on a four-point scale an inmate’s marital and family relation-
ships fall—from “[g]ood support and influence” to “[s]erious 
 167. See e.g., Clive R. Hollin, Treatment Programs for Offenders: Meta-
Analysis, “What Works,” and Beyond, 22 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 361, 367 
(1999) (noting the “garbage in, garbage out” problem in using meta-analysis to 
evaluate the efficacy of correctional programs).  
 168. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 280. 
 169. Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Cha-
os: Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1845, 1875 (2003) (pointing out that the developer of one risk assessment in-
strument “recognizes its subjective nature and recommends that at least two 
independent ratings be obtained and averaged” (quotation marks omitted)).  
 170. For example, the LSI-R takes into account multiple subjective risk 
factors including the offender’s “peer interactions,” “authority interactions,” 
and whether the offender is “supportive of crime.” Holsinger, supra note 114, 
at 312–13. 
 171. See Lisa M. Dennis, Constitutionality, Accuracy, Admissibility: As-
sessing Expert Predictions of Future Violence in Capital Sentencing Proceed-
ings, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 292, 307 (2002).  
 172. Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 575–76. 
 173. See id. 
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domestic discord or domestic violence.”174 It may be that family 
support, when perfectly measured, is an excellent predictor of 
recidivism;175 it is less clear that the same question item admin-
istered in practice produces high-quality data points. In keep-
ing with the garbage in, garbage out principle, the inclusion of 
such error-ridden inputs produces risk scores that are unrelia-
ble in unpredictable ways.176 This concern is amplified when in-
struments are administered by untrained individuals, in real-
world settings, with uncooperative subjects.177
C. THE UNKNOWN PREDICTIVE POWER OF CONSTITUTIONALLY 
COMPLIANT MODELING 
  
Apart from the statistical limitations of risk assessment, 
its use may be subject to legal limitations. Several factors typi-
cally used in statistical risk assessment, if tested through the 
appeals process, may not pass constitutional muster.178 Recent 
drafts of the MPC note, without explanation, that considering 
race and ethnicity “raises serious constitutional concerns,”179 
but find, again without discussion, that consideration of gender 
in risk assessment is permissible.180 Upon closer examination, 
the MPC drafters are spot-on in suggesting that including race 
or ethnicity into the list of factors built into a risk assessment 
instrument used at either parole or sentencing is unconstitu-
tional.181 Their position on gender, however, is not convincing 
under the case law.182
 
 174. Appendix C, supra note 
 
112. 
 175. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that family structure and family 
criminality are predictors of recidivism. Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 583. 
 176. See Hollin, supra note 167, at 367. 
 177. See Flores et al., supra note 121, at 528. 
 178. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s note e (Ten-
tative Draft No. 2, 2011).  
 179. Id. at reporter’s note i; see MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING  
§ 6B.06(2)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). But see MARCUS, supra note 113, 
at 10 (incorporating race/ethnicity into his risk assessment tool).  
 180. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.06(4)(b) (Tentative Draft No. 
1, 2007). The drafters do not justify this statement with an explicit constitu-
tional discussion nor do they explicate exactly what “grave concerns” trouble 
them. 
 181. E.g., United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding 
that national origin cannot be the basis for determining a sentence). 
 182. See, e.g., Williams v. Currie, 103 F. Supp. 2d 858, 868 (M.D.N.C. 2000) 
(holding that considering gender in sentencing violated the defendant’s equal 
protection rights). 
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Because the vast majority of risk assessment instruments 
do not consider race directly,183 there remains a question of 
whether analysis of factors that have nearly complete overlap 
with race is constitutional.184 For example, the frequently-used 
LSI-R takes into consideration whether the offender lives in a 
high-crime neighborhood.185 Because, at least in some cities, 
neighborhood of residence correlates nearly perfectly with 
race,186
While constitutional case law does not strictly prohibit all 
consideration of race or nationality at sentencing,
 this factor, at least in those geographic locations, oper-
ates as a proxy for race.  
187 it minimal-
ly requires the government to have a good reason for such con-
sideration. A satisfactory reason may be that the defendant’s 
race or ethnicity is relevant to rehabilitation or deterrence.188 A 
stricter court may even require the defendant’s race or ethnici-
ty to have been specifically connected to the commission of the 
defendant’s crime.189 Risk factors that overlap closely with race 
are unlikely to meet either of these standards. The empirical 
literature simply cannot demonstrate a causal relationship be-
tween race or ethnicity and propensity toward recidivism or re-
habilitation; at best, validated risk factors are correlated with 
outcomes.190
 
 183. But see, e.g., MARCUS, supra note 
 Further, even if such a causal relationship could be 
conclusively proven at the population level, it is not reasonable 
to conflate population-level causation with individual-level cau-
113. 
 184. This concern is raised, and explained away by the MPC’s drafters. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.06 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1997).  
 185. D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES L. BONTA, LSI-R PROFILE REPORT FOR REX 
DARLINGTON 4 (2001), available at http://www.psychassessments.com.au/ 
products/59/prod59_report1.pdf. 
 186. See, e.g., EDWARD L. GLAESER ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON 
URBAN & METRO. POLICY, RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE 2000 CENSUS: PROMIS-
ING NEWS 5–7 (2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/census/ 
glaeser.pdf (noting that the Midwest and Northeast remain more segregated 
than the South and West and that the largest cities are “significantly more 
segregated” than the national average).  
 187. See, e.g., United States v. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir. 
1989) (noting that geography may be considered if related to the crime). 
 188. E.g., United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1974).  
 189. E.g., Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d at 1356.  
 190. See John Q. La Fond, Clinical, Legal and Ethical Issues for Mental 
Health Professionals in Implementing a Sexual Predator Law in the United 
States, in SEX AND VIOLENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME AND RISK ASSESS-
MENT 116 (David P. Farrington et al. eds., 2001) (“Even validated risk factors 
only establish correlations; they do not establish causation.”). 
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sation.191 Because a population-level causal relationship be-
tween race or ethnicity or proxy factors is only dubiously sup-
ported by the literature,192 and a risk assessment instrument’s 
reliance on population-level correlation could never show indi-
vidual-level causation,193 a court would be unlikely to find that 
inclusion of risk factors that stand proxy for race demonstrates 
a general or specific propensity for rehabilitation or recidi-
vism.194 Even aside from the constitutional concern, there is a 
distinct danger of bad public policy when correlation is con-
fused with causation in this context. This is evident in one 
study’s reasoning that the correlation between minority race 
and criminal behavior indicates that minority populations 
“should have additional correctional resources made available 
to them”195 but does not consider what underlying societal con-
ditions might have produced the correlation. Similarly, gender 
is not generally a permissible consideration at either sentenc-
ing or parole because the statistical relationship between gen-
der and recidivism does not indicate a propensity for recidivism 
or rehabilitation and it is not specifically connected with the 
commission of a particular crime.196
In order to create a risk assessment instrument that does 
not offend the Constitution, race and ethnicity, factors closely 
overlapping with race and ethnicity, and gender must be 
purged from the list of inputs. But because race
  
197 and gender198 
are fairly reliable predictors of criminal behavior,199 removing 
them will reduce the predictive capability of risk assess-
ments.200
 
 191. Such an unfounded conclusion is known as an “ecological fallacy.” See 
Sharon Schwartz, The Fallacy of the Ecological Fallacy: The Potential Misuse 
of a Concept and the Consequences, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 819, 820–22 (1994). 
 Nailing down the exact magnitude of this reduction in 
 192. Id. at 821. 
 193. Id.  
 194. See Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d at 1356 (requiring a specific connection to 
the crime); United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1974) (requir-
ing only a general connection). 
 195. See Holsinger, supra note 114, at 318. It is not entirely clear what 
such “correctional resources” might include, but certainly one reasonable in-
terpretation is that correctional resources is code for more incarceration.  
 196. See Williams v. Currie, 103 F. Supp. 2d 858, 868 (M.D.N.C. 2000). 
 197. Reitz, Sentencing, supra note 23, at 486. 
 198. Patrick A. Langan & David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released 
in 1994, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 58, 61 (2002). 
 199. Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 583. 
 200. Cf. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 26, at 27–28 (describing the Virginia Sentencing Commis-
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predictive power is difficult for two reasons. First, extracting 
constitutionally dubious input factors from instruments that 
consider interaction between factors may be impossible without 
rerunning the initial analyses.201 Second, even if the initial de-
velopment studies are susceptible to manipulation that would 
reveal the predictive power of only a subset of the included risk 
factors, these development studies may not be published or 
may not be published with enough methodological detail to al-
low this type of calibration.202
The exclusion of gender presents an added wrinkle not pre-
sent when factors overlapping with race or ethnicity are ex-
cluded.
  
203 Specifically, because women recidivate at a lower rate 
than men do,204 removing gender from the model artificially in-
flates women’s risk assessment scores.205 To some extent, this 
effect is moderated by the fact that there are systematic differ-
ences between male and female offenders which mean female 
offenders tend to receive lower risk scores even when the in-
strument does not explicitly consider gender.206
D. RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS IN PRACTICE 
 However, the 
problem remains, leaving parole boards and sentencing judges 
with two bad choices: (1) despite the constitutional concerns, 
use an instrument that considers gender because it more accu-
rately predicts women’s risk or (2) comply with the constitu-
tional prohibition on unwarranted consideration of gender and 
tolerate that women will receive higher risk scores.  
The foregoing critiques are primarily based on the empiri-
cal literature examining statistical risk assessment. In prac-
tice, these limitations continue to apply and are amplified by 
likely errors caused by improper implementation and admin-
istration of the instruments as well by the manner in which re-
sults of risk assessments are communicated to decision-
 
sion’s efforts to reassess the validity of its instrument after choosing not to in-
clude race, despite its predictive power).  
 201. See id. 
 202. See Sachsenmaier & Lally, supra note 135, at 26–27.  
 203. Because non-white race is positively associated with recidivism, see 
Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 583, not considering race tends to pull risk 
scores for non-white offenders down. 
 204. See Langan & Levin, supra note 198, at 61. 
 205. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.06(2)(a) cmt. d (Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 206. See Holsinger, supra note 114, at 313.  
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makers.207 Problems with implementation might include failure 
to conduct validation studies in the population in which the in-
strument is to be used208 or alterations to the original model on 
which the instrument is based. For example, Texas uses a risk 
assessment instrument originally developed by the state of 
Wisconsin.209 Texas alters the instrument by weighting one risk 
factor, whether the inmate has committed an assault in the 
previous five years, more heavily than the factor is weighted in 
the original instrument.210 Alterations, including adding risk 
factors or reweighting risk factors, are particularly troubling 
because such alterations interrupt the integrity of the underly-
ing analysis.211
The predictive power of risk assessment instruments may 
also be limited by suboptimal administration. The empirical 
literature repeatedly emphasizes the importance of proper staff 
training to reach the full predictive potential of risk assessment 
instruments.
  
212 In practice, however, the staff members admin-
istering risk assessment instruments213 and the individuals in-
terpreting the results may not have the required training.214 
Moreover, uneven staff skill levels caused by inadequate train-
ing diminish inter-rater reliability by introducing systematic 
differences in risk scores between different administrators.215 It 
may be especially difficult to detect problems caused by poor 
administration when instruments are used at stages of the 
criminal process that have little knowledgeable oversight.216
 
 207. See Flores et al., supra note 
 
121, at 528. 
 208. See KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 13. 
 209. MARC LEVIN, POLICY PERSPECTIVE: THE ROLE OF RISK ASSESSMENT IN 
ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY IN TEXAS CORRECTIONS 2 (2010), 
available at www.texaspolicy.com/sites/default/files/documents/2010-07-PP15 
-RiskAssessment_ml.pdf.  
 210. Id. 
 211. Cf. Berk & Freedman, supra note 144, at 245–46 (discussing the as-
sumptions underlying statistical models). 
 212. E.g., id.; CAMPBELL, supra note 101, at 38; Holsinger, supra note 114, 
at 310.  
 213. See Flores et al., supra note 121, at 526 (comparing predictive power 
of the LSI-R when used by formally trained and untrained staff members).  
 214. For example, parole board members interpreting risk assessment 
scores may not have expertise in criminal psychology. See MISS. CODE ANN.  
§ 47-7-5(2) (2009) (amended 2012).  
 215. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 15.  
 216. Cf. D.A. Andrews et al., Classification for Effective Rehabilitation: Re-
discovering Psychology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19, 26 (1990) (expressing 
dismay at the frequency with which criminal justice professionals are unfamil-
iar with simple concepts of risk and recidivism).  
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Finally, the manner in which the results of risk assessment 
instruments are typically communicated to decision-makers 
impacts their utility. Decision-makers generally receive the re-
sults of a risk assessment expressed as a point estimate of a 
probability of recidivism.217 By relying on a point estimate of 
probability of recidivism, the decision-maker is blind to the lev-
el of error inherent in that probability calculation.218
In sum, statistical risk assessments suffer from several key 
deficiencies that limit their predictive power. Even if these in-
struments are administered and implemented perfectly—a 
practical impossibility—they can only predict the expected 
population behavior and this prediction is inevitably uncertain. 
In no instance can a risk assessment instrument ever predict 
with certainty what any one person will do in the future.
 So while a 
parole board member or sentencing judge may get a report that 
indicates an offender has a “high” risk of recidivism, she is not 
likely to be informed of the confidence interval surrounding 
that point estimate. 
219
III.  BALANCING PREDICTIVE POWER AND 
PROCEDURAL PROTECTION   
  
Because statistical risk assessment is both imperfect and 
useful to the criminal justice system,220 the use of statistical 
risk assessment to make choices about incarceration should be 
carefully controlled. A recent draft of the MPC proposes lan-
guage to this effect: “The commission shall develop instruments 
or processes, supported by current and ongoing recidivism re-
search, that will estimate the relative risks that individual of-
fenders pose to public safety through their future criminal con-
duct.”221
 
 217. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 
 The Code further clarifies that instruments may be 
26, at 29 (describing Virginia’s policy decision to recom-
mend diversion from incarceration for those offenders whose scores indicate a 
less than 12% probability of reconviction within three years). 
 218. See Stephen D. Hart et al., Precision of Actuarial Risk Assessment In-
struments: Evaluating the “Margins of Error” of Group v. Individual Predic-
tions of Violence, 190 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY s60, s61 (2007). 
 219. See La Fond, supra note 190, at 115–16 (“It should be noted that actu-
arial prediction tools only identify offenders who are members of a group that 
has these probabilities of committing another sex offense. They do not neces-
sarily identify which individual members of the group will reoffend.”). 
 220. See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 42, at 1406 (noting that statistical risk as-
sessment predicts risk of recidivism more accurately than intuition alone). 
 221. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2011). 
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incorporated into sentencing guidelines of the state when they 
“prove sufficiently reliable.”222 The Code’s drafters argue that 
placing risk assessment at sentencing “‘domesticates’ the use of 
risk assessments by repositioning them in the open forum of 
the courtroom, where the tools devised . . . are available for in-
spection, and where the constitution guarantees the offender 
legal representation to contest any adverse findings.”223
This Part expands on the reasoning of the drafters of the 
MPC and argues that statistical risk assessment potentially 
provides sentencing judges with useful information relevant to 
determining an appropriate sentence and that the procedures 
available to defendants at sentencing protect defendants from 
overreliance on these imperfect instruments better than the 
procedures available at parole. Indeed, one major advantage of 
this procedural adjustment is that a skillful defense attorney is 
able to draw the sentencing judge’s attention to statistical 
weaknesses discussed above. This Part further suggests that 
the MPC be modified to include a definition of “sufficiently reli-
able” and that sentencing judges be specifically instructed to 
consider the uncertainty of risk estimates produced by any risk 
assessment instruments in order to provide defendants with 
even more robust protection. 
  
A. WHY USE RISK ASSESSMENT AT ALL? 
Despite their limitations, risk assessment instruments 
have considerable value. Recidivist criminals are a serious con-
cern,224 and scientists have empirically demonstrated that sta-
tistical risk assessment much more accurately predicts recidi-
vism than do individuals relying on intuition and experience.225 
For this reason, judges should be allowed to use the results of 
statistical risk assessment, as long as the procedural protec-
tions available to defendants are adequate and the instrument 
sufficiently reliable to guard against injustice.226
 
 222. Id.  
 
 223. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2011). 
 224. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Soumyo Moitra, The Identification of 
“Career Criminals” from “Chronic Offenders” in a Cohort, 2 LAW & POL’Y Q. 
321, 322 (1980) (citing a study finding a small proportion of offenders are re-
sponsible for a large portion of criminal offenses).  
 225. Wolff, supra note 42, at 1406 n.73.  
 226. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 
2, 2011). 
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Setting aside for a moment the issue of procedural protec-
tion, risk assessment may actually better prevent recidivism 
when it is used at sentencing than when it issued at parole. Be-
cause spending any time in prison at all is a strong predictor of 
recidivism,227 especially for low risk offenders,228 using risk as-
sessment to identify low-risk offenders appropriate for work re-
lease or other less restrictive sentences may reduce crime by 
preventing this risk factor from ever developing.229 The second 
draft of the MPC resonates with this reasoning, advising judges 
and sentencing commissions to use low risk scores as a mitigat-
ing factor and grounds for a downward departure in sentenc-
ing.230 Thus, moving the use of statistical risk assessment for-
ward in the criminal process may reduce state expenditures on 
unnecessary incarceration, prevent recidivism, and promote the 
liberty of low-risk offenders. This strategy has proven effective 
in Virginia. The state reports that using such a strategy divert-
ed 555 offenders from incarceration and saved state and local 
governments over $8.5 million dollars between 1997 and 
1999.231
B. SENTENCING, NOT PAROLE, IS THE APPROPRIATE FORUM TO 
CONSIDER THE RESULTS OF STATISTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
Using risk assessment at sentencing rather than at parole 
both better serves the public interest in preventing recidivism 
and is fairer to defendants. The major argument for waiting 
until parole to use risk assessment is that dynamic factors re-
lated to inmates’ in-prison behavior are predictive of recidi-
vism.232
 
 227. See Gendreau et al., supra note 
 This argument is limited because there is considerable 
doubt regarding whether subjective dynamic factors can be or 
8, at 583 (reporting criminal history as 
a predictor of recidivism). 
 228. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP & EDWARD J. LATESSA, UNDERSTAND-
ING THE RISK PRINCIPLE: HOW AND WHY CORRECTIONAL INTERVENTIONS CAN 
HARM LOW-RISK OFFENDERS 7 (2004), available at http://www.yourhonor.com/ 
dwi/sentencing/RiskPrinciple.pdf.  
 229. For example, Virginia now uses risk assessment at sentencing with 
the goal of diverting offenders from the prison system and reducing overall 
inmate populations. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE VA. CRIMINAL SEN-
TENCING COMM’N, supra note 26, at 9–10. 
 230. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 
2, 2011). 
 231. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 26, at 100. 
 232. See Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 591 (arguing dynamic factors 
“must be included” in risk assessment).  
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are measured reliably.233 The argument for including dynamic 
risk factors is further undercut by the relatively undeveloped 
and untested theoretical basis for measuring such dynamic fac-
tors.234 Even if we assume that such factors can be accurately 
and reliably measured, there is reasonable reluctance to con-
nect an individual’s behavior while incarcerated to his or her 
behavior while integrated into society.235 Incarceration is a con-
trolled atmosphere and very different from the outside world, 
so some experts question whether in-custody behavior gives a 
reliable read on how an offender will behave once exposed to 
old temptations, habits, and associates.236 In the real world, the 
exclusion of dynamic risk factors may make little difference. 
According to a 2007 survey conducted by the state of Connecti-
cut, the majority of state parole boards use instruments that 
include only one or no dynamic factors.237 For the foregoing rea-
sons, very little predictive power is lost if states use only infor-
mation that is available at sentencing.238
Moreover, because the procedural protections at these 
stages are different, it is fairer to defendants to limit the use of 
risk assessment to sentencing. An individual’s opportunity to 
challenge the results or admission of a score yielded from the 
use of a risk assessment instrument is dramatically different 
depending on whether that person is a defendant facing sen-
tencing or an inmate hoping for parole release.
 
239 In crafting a 
policy for appropriate use of risk assessment, policymakers 
must balance the social value of preventing crime and the po-
tential unfairness to defendants resulting from the very serious 
limitations of risk assessment.240
 
 233. See, e.g., Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 
 Allowing defendants to avail 
themselves of the procedural protections available at the sen-
20, at 
280–81. 
 234. See Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 576 (expressing concern at the 
lack of empirical focus on dynamic factors). 
 235. O’Leary & Glaser, supra note 4, at 157–58. 
 236. See id.  
 237. RATANSI & COX, supra note 112, at 10–11 (2007).  
 238. See CHAMPION, supra note 22, at 243 (arguing that better success pre-
dictors come outside of prison). 
 239. See, e.g., Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 801 (4th Cir. 1977) (per 
curiam) (finding inmates are not entitled to personal parole hearings, access to 
their own files, or the ability to call witnesses to appear in their behalf). 
 240. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 26, at 29–30 (describing the policy rationale behind select-
ing a risk threshold for diversion).  
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tencing stage appropriately achieves this balance. This is so 
even without the statutory innovations described below. 
The single most important procedural check on the use of 
risk assessment is the availability of a defense attorney at sen-
tencing.241 At sentencing, the defense lawyer can advocate to 
obtain the statistical risk assessment instrument, the instru-
ment’s underlying theory and methodology, and the defendant’s 
risk assessment report.242 Without this kind of access, the de-
fendant could not even begin to challenge the accuracy or ap-
propriateness of the risk assessment.243
Even if a state chose not to adopt a statute establishing a 
minimum level of reliability for risk assessment instruments, a 
skillful defense lawyer could still effectively advocate for his or 
her client by articulating a constitutional challenge to particu-
lar factors included in the assessment.
 Once a defense attorney 
has access to information related to the risk assessment in-
strument, he can carefully examine whether the assumptions 
underlying the statistical model are justified and check wheth-
er the instrument has been validated in the local population. 
Similarly, an attorney can gather information about whether 
the instrument relies on inputs that are particularly difficult to 
measure and whether the method in which the instrument was 
administered might damage its reliability. If his investigation 
raises concerns, an attorney can draw the court’s attention to 
them and advocate for the assessment to be considered in light 
of its weaknesses. 
244 From there, a defense 
lawyer might argue that because constitutionally compliant in-
struments have limited predictive power, the instrument is not 
reliable enough to be admitted at all. Although the only court to 
examine the issue has found that statistical risk assessment is 
appropriate at sentencing,245
 
 241. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (finding that a law-
yer can “take steps” to protect the defendant’s due process rights).  
 the defendant in that case did not 
specifically challenge the instrument’s reliability or its consti-
 242. See Wolff, supra note 42, at 1408–09 (“Risk assessment methodology—
whatever its components—ought to be shared among . . . prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, probation officers, judges, prison officials, parole boards, and parole 
officers.”). 
 243. See Sachsenmaier & Lally, supra note 135, at 27 (detailing the process 
of verifying risk assessment accuracy). 
 244. As discussed in Part II.C, the inclusion of some factors in risk assess-
ments, including gender and close proxies for race and gender, is likely uncon-
stitutional. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s note 
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001). 
 245. Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. 2010).  
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tutionality.246 Instead, that defendant argued that the judge 
failed to provide an individualized sentence by relying too heav-
ily on the risk score.247 It is certainly possible, in the absence of 
a statutory reliability standard, that a court would find risk as-
sessment admissible because it is objectively more reliable than 
the psychiatric prediction of future dangerousness248 held ad-
missible at sentencing by the United States Supreme Court.249 
Even so, admissibility decisions involving scientific evidence 
are notoriously unpredictable250 and so it is conceivable that a 
court, prompted by a defense attorney, might find that a statis-
tical risk assessment instrument is so unreliable that it is in-
admissible.251 Even if the court ultimately admitted the risk 
score, a skillful attack on its reliability or constitutionality 
might draw the court’s attention to the limitations of the in-
strument and lead it to afford the risk score less weight.252
At sentencing, the defendant also has the advantage of the 
opportunity to appeal the sentence
  
253 and a qualified finder-of-
fact.254 There is ample evidence indicating that people tend to 
over-rely on scientific evidence such as statistical risk assess-
ment because it appears objective and conclusive.255
 
 246. See Brief of Appellee at 10, Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. 
2010) (No. 79S02-0908-CR-365). 
 Judges are 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Palmer, supra note 139, at 8 (stating that “it is generally accept-
ed” that statistical prediction is more reliable than clinical prediction).  
 249. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983).  
 250. See Cassandra Welch, Flexibile Standards, Deferential Review: 
Daubert’s Legacy of Confusion, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1086 (2006). 
 251. See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk 
Assessment: How a Developing Science Can Enhance Accuracy and Accounta-
bility, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 176, 177 (2004) (arguing admissibility decisions 
are unpredictable “because ‘reliability’ is a continuous variable (no method is 
perfectly reliable), and the evidentiary tests do not specify how much reliabil-
ity is required. It is the underlying substantive law—the legal context—that 
determines how much reliability is necessary”). 
 252. See State v. Woomer, 299 S.E.2d 317, 320 (S.C. 1982) (opining that the 
defendant’s objection to the reliability of the evidence was relevant to the 
weight the evidence ought to receive).  
 253. E.g., United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2007) (challenging 
the constitutionality of a sentence). 
 254. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977). 
 255. This phenomenon has been particularly explored in the context of the 
admissibility of scientific evidence at trial under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Although the Daubert test is inapplicable at sen-
tencing hearings, the academic critique of that test also applies at sentencing. 
See Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the 
Law’s Hubris, 43 EMORY L.J. 913, 920 (1994) (arguing that no matter what the 
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qualified to understand evidence of all sorts, and so are well-
suited to handle the challenge of reasonably weighing the value 
and limitations of statistical risk assessments. In particular, 
judges have extensive experience with expert scientific evi-
dence.256 In most legal contexts, judges are trusted to be the 
gatekeepers for all scientific evidence,257 so interpreting the risk 
scores produced by risk assessment instruments fits neatly in 
the judicial wheelhouse.258
By contrast, at parole, an inmate is unlikely to be able to 
meaningfully object to the use of a statistical risk assessment 
instrument. The inmate’s likely pro se status and the lack of an 
admissibility test at parole mean that an inmate will rarely 
have the professional support necessary or the legal hook re-
quired to challenge the reliability of a risk assessment instru-
ment.
  
259 Along these same lines, the lack of formal process and 
legal representation mean that an inmate is unlikely to be able 
to argue a risk assessment instrument violates the Constitu-
tion, even though the prohibition on consideration of certain 
characteristics applies just as much at parole as it does at sen-
tencing.260 Even if an inmate manages to overcome these obsta-
cles and effectively express an objection to the use of risk as-
sessment, the inmate is at the mercy of the members of the 
parole board who are much less qualified than judges to assess 
the quality of complex evidence.261 Furthermore, inmates at pa-
role do not generally have a meaningful avenue for appeal.262
Recognizing that statistical risk assessment has real value 
to protect the public, reduce expenditures, and divert low-risk 
  
 
standard of admissibility, judges will defer to “what certain experts think”). 
 256. Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey 
of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 433, 434 (2001) (noting that “judges are central and active fig-
ures in admissibility decision-making”). 
 257. See id.  
 258. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. c (Tentative Draft 
No. 2, 2011) (arguing that the appropriate interpretation of risk assessment 
instruments “will reside in the discretion of the trial judge”). 
 259. See id. § 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011). 
 260. See United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding 
consideration of race impermissible at sentencing); Tex. Supporters of Workers 
World Party Presidential Candidates v. Strake, 511 F.Supp. 149, 155 (S.D. 
Tex. 1981) (finding a parole board may not consider race in making its release 
decision). 
 261. See Andrews et al., supra note 216, at 26.  
 262. See Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 277–79 
(describing the wide discretion granted to parole boards). 
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offenders from incarceration, it is good public policy to make 
use of the technology. The array of procedural protections 
available to defendants at sentencing, and unavailable to in-
mates seeking parole release, all point to using statistical risk 
assessment exclusively at sentencing. The requirement of coun-
sel, evidentiary standards, and oversight by qualified trial 
judges combine to provide a forum that is well-equipped to 
manage the advantages and limitations of statistical risk as-
sessment.263
C. PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO THE MPC 
 
Because statistical risk assessment is unreliable in some 
circumstances264 and the stakes are high in this context—no 
less than the difference between freedom and incarceration—
the relatively minimal evidentiary reliability standard required 
by the Constitution265 may be inadequate. Although the MPC’s 
suggestion that “sufficiently reliable” risk assessment instru-
ments ought to be used at sentencing is sound given the poten-
tial upsides of using risk assessment, policymakers and de-
fendants may benefit from a statutory definition of “sufficiently 
reliable.”266
In particular, the MPC should specify that a risk assess-
ment instrument must be based on analyses of the statistical 
relationships between objective criteria and recidivism in a 
sample drawn from the population of the state in which the in-
strument is to be used or in a substantially similar population. 
Requiring objective criteria instead of subjective criteria reduc-
es the risk of error associated with inexpert administration
  
267 
and low inter-rater reliability.268 Similarly, by using an instru-
ment based on the state’s population or a population similar to 
it, states can avoid inaccuracies in risk scores resulting from a 
poor match between the population used in the underlying 
analysis and the population in which the state actually uses the 
instrument.269
 
 263. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011). 
 In either case, the instrument should be validat-
 264. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 139, at 7. 
 265. See, e.g., People v. Owens, 464 N.E.2d 262, 271 (Ill. 1984). 
 266. Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 621 (1992) (arguing that when an issue arises frequently, it is 
reasonable to anticipate at the outset how to resolve the question by adopting 
a specific rule). 
 267. See Flores et al., supra note 121, at 526. 
 268. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 15. 
 269. See Lowenkamp et al., supra note 147, at 560. 
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ed periodically in the state’s population to assure that it re-
mains effective even when the state’s population changes.270
These two additions to the MPC’s draft section 6B.09 
would enhance the section’s purpose by providing structure to 
the delicate balance between protecting public safety and re-
sponsibly stewarding public funds and protecting defendants 
from unfair use of risk assessment. Although the MPC is not 
binding in any jurisdiction, it is highly influential: over two-
thirds of states have adopted at least some part of the Code 
with some states adopting it nearly in full.
 In 
addition, the MPC should specify that sentencing judges con-
sidering the results of a risk assessment instrument must be 
provided with the confidence intervals associated with the re-
sults and a copy of any assessment that has been conducted. 
271
  CONCLUSION   
 The proposed re-
vision to the MPC, if adopted, is similarly likely to influence 
state legislatures developing their own policies on the responsi-
ble use of statistical risk assessment. 
Statistical risk assessment has social value because it pre-
vents crime by identifying high risk offenders and reduces soci-
etal costs by diverting low-risk offenders from incarceration. 
Although risk assessment instruments are presently used by 
both judges and parole boards, states should, as a recent draft 
of the MPC suggests in section 6B.09, limit the use of suffi-
ciently reliable instruments to the sentencing stage. Doing so 
would allow society to reap the benefits of risk assessment and 
would control against inappropriate use of such instruments by 
allowing defendants to avail themselves of the procedural pro-
tections available at sentencing. Because statistical risk as-
sessment instruments have limited predictive power and are 
susceptible to improper use, the MPC should modify section 
6B.09 to include a definition of “sufficiently reliable,” which 
states should, in turn, adopt. Setting a statutory standard for 
minimally reliable risk assessment instruments would allow 
states to ensure a fair balance between the social value of pre-
venting recidivism by predicting risk and protecting defendants 
by refraining from unnecessarily labeling them as high risk 
based on uncertain statistics. 
 
 270. See Schlager & Simourd, supra note 154, at 546 (revealing through a 
validation study the limitations of the LSI-R in certain populations). 
 271. Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 NW. U. 
L. REV. 857, 858 n.3 (1994). 
